Church's synthesis problem asks whether there exists a finite-state stream transducer satisfying a given input-output specification. For specifications written in Monadic Second-Order Logic (MSO) over infinite words, Church's synthesis can theoretically be solved algorithmically using automata and games. We revisit Church's synthesis via the Curry-Howard correspondence by introducing SMSO, an intuitionistic variant of MSO over infinite words, which is shown to be sound and complete w.r.t. synthesis thanks to an automata-based realizability model.
Introduction
A stream function F : Σ ω → Γ ω is synchronous (or causal ) if it can produce a prefix of length n of its output from a prefix of length n of its input: B(0). · · · .B(n − 1) = C(0). · · · .C(n − 1) =⇒ F (B)(n) = F (C)(n) (for B, C ∈ Σ ω ) A synchronous function is finite-state if it is induced by a deterministic letter-to-letter stream transducer (or deterministic Mealy machine, DMM). Church's synthesis [Chu57] consists in the automatic extraction of DMMs from input-output specifications, typically presented as closed formulae of the form ∀X ∈ Σ ω ∃Y ∈ Γ ω ϕ(X; Y ) (1.1) where ϕ is a formula of some subsystem of Monadic Second-Order Logic (MSO) over ω-words. A specification as in (1.1) is realized in the sense of Church by a (finite-state) synchronous F : Σ ω → Γ ω when ϕ(B, F (B)) holds for all B ∈ Σ ω .
MSO over ω-words is a decidable logic (Büchi's Theorem [Büc62] ) which subsumes logics used in verification such as LTL (see e.g. [Tho97, PP04, VW08] ). Traditional approaches to synthesis (see e.g. [Tho08, Tho09] ) are based, via McNaughton's Theorem [McN66] , on the translation of MSO-formulae to deterministic automata on ω-words (such as Muller or parity automata). 1 These automata are then turned into infinite two-players sequential games on finite graphs, in which the Opponent (∀bélard) plays input letters to which the Proponent (∃loïse) replies with output letters. Solutions to Church's synthesis are then given by the Büchi-Landweber Theorem [BL69] , which states that in such games, (exactly) one of the two players has a finite-state winning strategy (i.e. a strategy which only uses a finite memory).
Fully automatic approaches to synthesis suffer from prohibitively high computational costs, essentially for the following two reasons. First, the translation of MSO-formulae to automata is non-elementary (see e.g. [GTW02] ), and McNaughton's Theorem involves a non-trivial powerset construction (such as Safra construction, see e.g. [Tho97, GTW02, PP04, VW08] ). Second, similarly as with other automatic verification techniques based on Model Checking, the solution of parity games ultimately relies on exhaustive state exploration. While they have had (and still have) considerable success for verifying concurrency properties, such techniques hardly managed up to now to scale up to practical algorithms for the synthesis of large scale systems (even for fragments of LTL, see e.g. [BJP + 12] ).
In this work, we propose a Curry-Howard approach to Church's synthesis. The Curry-Howard correspondence asserts that, given a suitable proof system, any proof therein can be interpreted as a program. This interpretation of proofs as programs (as well as the soundness of many type systems) can be formalized using the technique of realizability, which tells how to read a formula from the logic as a specification for a program. More precisely, realizability can be seen as a relation between programs (the realizers) and formulae, usually defined by induction on the latter (see e.g. [SU06, Koh08] ). Typical clauses state e.g. that realizers of conjunctions ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 are pairs R 1 , R 2 consisting of a realizer R 1 of ϕ 1 and a realizer R 2 of ϕ 2 , and that realizers of existential formulae ∃X ϕ(X) are pairs B, R consisting of a witness B for the ∃X and a realizer R of ϕ(B).
Our starting point is the fact that MSO on ω-words can be completely axiomatized as a subsystem of second-order Peano arithmetic [Sie70] (see also [Rib12] ). From the classical axiomatization of MSO, we derive an intuitionistic variant SMSO (for Synchronous MSO). SMSO comes equipped with an extraction procedure which is sound and complete w.r.t. Church's synthesis: proofs of SMSO-formulae of the form ∃Y ϕ(X; Y ) (with only X free) can be translated to DMMs and such proofs exist for all solvable instances of Church's synthesis. The key of our approach is that while we never have to actually use McNaughton's Theorem when extracting DMMs from SMSO-proofs (so that the extracted DMMs never involve determinization of automata on ω-words), we do rely on McNaughton's Theorem for the correctness of the extraction procedure (i.e. the "Adequacy Lemma" of realizability).
The paper is organized as follows. We first recall in §2 some background on MSO and Church's synthesis. Our intuitionistic system SMSO is then presented in §3. We provide in §4 some technical material as well as detailed examples on the representation of DMMs in MSO, and §5 presents our realizability model. Finally, in §6 we rephrase the realizability model in terms of indexed categories (see e.g. [Jac01] ), an essential step for further generalizations.
We also have included three appendices. They give detailed arguments and constructions that we wished not to put in the body of the paper, either because they are necessary but unsurprising technicalities (App. A and C), or because they concern important but side results, proved with different techniques than those emphasized in this paper (App. B). (3) The DMM depicted in Fig. 1 (right) , taken from [Tho08] , induces a synchronous function F : 2 → M 2 such that Φ(B, F (B)) holds for all B ∈ 2 ω , where Φ is the relation of Ex. 2.1. (4) Synchronous functions are obviously continuous (taking the product topology on Σ ω and Γ ω , with Σ, Γ discrete), but there are continuous functions which are not synchronous, for instance the function P : 2 ω → 2 ω such that P (B)(n) = 1 iff B(n + 1) = 1.
For the definition and adequacy of our realizability interpretation ( §5), it is convenient to note that alphabets and (finite-state) synchronous functions form a category.
Proposition 2.5. Synchronous functions form a category S whose objects are alphabets and whose morphisms from Σ to Γ are the synchronous functions Σ → S Γ. The identity on Σ is the synchronous function of Ex. 2.4.(1), and composition is usual function composition. Moreover, if the S-maps F : Σ → S Γ and G : Γ → S ∆ are finite-state, then so is G • F .
Proof. Since sets and functions form a category, S is a category as soon as composition of functions preserves synchronicity. Consider synchronous G : Γ ω → ∆ ω and F : Σ ω → Γ ω . Assume B, C ∈ Σ ω and n ∈ N such that B n = C n. Then since F is synchronous it follows that F (B) n = F (C) n, and since G is synchronous we deduce G(F (B)) n = G(F (C)) n, that is (G • F )(B) n = (G • F )(C) n For the second part of the statement, assume that G and F are induced respectively by N : Γ → ∆ and M : Σ → Γ. Then G • F is induced by the DMM (K : Σ → ∆) := Q M × Q N , (q ı M , q ı N ) , ∂ K whose transition function
Proposition 2.5 implies that S has a wide subcategory consisting of finite-state functions.
Definition 2.6 (The Category M). Let M be the category whose objects are alphabets and whose morphisms from Σ to Γ are finite-state synchronous functions Σ → M Γ.
Note that for M to be a category (namely for the associativity and identity laws of composition) it is essential that M-maps consist of functions rather than machines. The following obvious fact is useful for our realizability model ( §5).
Atoms:
α : It is also worth noticing that the category M has finite products.
Proposition 2.8. The category M has finite products. The product of Σ 1 , . . . , Σ n (for n ≥ 0) is given by the Set-product Σ 1 × · · · × Σ n (so that 1 is terminal in M).
2.3.
Monadic Second-Order Logic (MSO) on Infinite Words. We consider a formulation of MSO based on a purely relational two-sorted language, with a specific choice of atomic formulae. There is a sort of individuals, with variables x, y, z, etc., and a sort of (monadic) predicates, with variables X, Y, Z, etc. Our formulae for MSO, denoted ϕ, ψ, etc. are given in Fig. 2 . They are defined by mutual induction with the deterministic formulae (denoted δ, δ , etc.) from atomic formulae ranged over by α. MSO formulae are interpreted in the standard model N of ω-words as usual. Individual variables range over natural numbers n, m, . . . ∈ N and predicate variables range over sets of natural numbers B, C, . . . ∈ P(N) 2 ω . The atomic predicates are interpreted as expected: . = is equality,∈ is membership,≤ is the relation ≤ on N, S is the successor relation, and Z holds on n iff n = 0. We write N |= ϕ when the closed formula ϕ holds under this interpretation.
We often write X(x) or even Xx for x∈ X. We also use the following abbreviations.
Notation 2.9. Given formulae ϕ and ψ, we let
We moreover let, for z not free in ϕ:
MSO on ω-words is known to be decidable by Büchi's Theorem [Büc62] .
Theorem 2.10 (Büchi [Büc62] ). MSO over N is decidable.
Following [Büc62] (but see also e.g. [PP04, VW08] ), the (non-deterministic) automata method for deciding MSO proceeds by a recursive translation of MSO-formulae to nondeterministic Büchi automata (NBAs). An NBA is an NFA running on ω-words and for which an (infinite) run is accepting if it has infinitely many occurrences of final states. The crux of Büchi's Theorem is the effective closure of NBAs under complement. Let us recall a few known facts on the complementation of NBAs (see e.g. [Tho97, GTW02] ). First, the translation of MSO-formulae to automata is non-elementary. Second, its is known that deterministic Büchi automata (DBAs) are strictly less expressive than NBAs. Finally, it is known that complementation of NBAs is algorithmically hard: there is a family of languages (L n ) n>0 such that each L n can be recognized by an NBA with n + 2 states, but such that the complement of L n cannot be recognized by an NBA with less than n! states.
2.4.
Church's Synthesis for MSO. Church's synthesis problem for MSO is the following. Given as input an MSO-formula ϕ(X; Y ) (with only free variables X = X 1 , . . . , X p and Y = Y 1 , . . . , Y q ), (1) decide whether there exist finite-state synchronous functions F = F 1 , . . . , F q with each F i : 2 p → M 2 (so that F : 2 p → M 2 q collectively) such that N |= ϕ(B; F (B)) for all B ∈ (2 ω ) p (2 p ) ω , and (2) construct such F whenever they exist.
Given a formula ϕ(X, Y ) as above, we say that F : 2 p → M 2 q realizes ϕ(X; Y ) in the sense of Church (or Church-realizes ϕ(X; Y )) when ϕ(B, F (B)) holds for all B.
Example 2.11. The specification Φ of Ex. 2.1 can be officially written in the language of MSO as the following formula φ(X; Y ):
Church's synthesis has been shown to be solvable by Büchi Tho97] ), which states that Büchi automata can be translated to equivalent deterministic finite state automata, but equipped with stronger acceptance conditions than Büchi automata. There are different variants of such conditions: Muller, Rabin, Streett or parity conditions (see e.g. [Tho97, GTW02, PP04]). All of them can specify states which must not occur infinitely often in an accepting run. For the purpose of this paper, we only need to consider the simplest of them, the Muller conditions. A Muller condition is given by a family of set of states T , and a run is accepting when the set of states occurring infinitely often in it belongs to the family T .
Theorem 2.12 (McNaughton [McN66] ). Each NBA is equivalent to a deterministic Muller automaton.
There is a lower bound in 2 Ω(n log(n)) on the number of states of a deterministic Muller automaton equivalent to an NBA with n states [Yan08] . The best known constructions for McNaughton's Theorem (such as Safra's construction or its variants) give deterministic Muller automata with 2 O(n log(n)) states from NBAs with n states.
The standard solution to Church's synthesis for MSO starts by translating ϕ(X; Y ) to a deterministic Muller automaton, and then turns this deterministic automaton into a two-player sequential game, in which the Opponent ∀bélard plays input bit sequences in 2 p while the Proponent ∃loïse replies with output bit sequences in 2 q , so that Proponent's strategies correspond to synchronous functions 2 p → S 2 q . The game is equipped with an ω-regular winning condition (induced by the acceptance condition of the Muller automaton). The solution is then provided by Büchi-Landweber Theorem [BL69] , which states that ω-regular games on finite graphs are effectively determined, and moreover that the winner always has a finite state winning strategy. Example 2.13. Consider the last conjunct φ 2 [X, Y ] := (∃ ∞ t ¬Xt) → (∃ ∞ t ¬Y t) of the formula φ(X; Y ) of Ex. 2.11. When translating φ 2 to a finite state automaton, the positive occurrence of (∃ ∞ t ¬Y t) can be translated to a DBA. However, the negative occurrence of (∃ ∞ t ¬Xt) corresponds to (∀ ∞ t Xt) and cannot be translated to a deterministic Büchi automaton. Even if a very simple two-states Muller automaton exists for (∀ ∞ t Xt), McNaughton's Theorem 2.12 is in general required for Boolean combinations of ∃ ∞ t (−)'s.
2.5. An Axiomatization of MSO. Our approach to Church's synthesis relies on the fact that the MSO-theory of N can be completely axiomatized as a subsystem of second-order Peano arithmetic [Sie70] (see also [Rib12] ). For the purpose of this paper, it is convenient to axiomatize MSO with the non-logical rules of Fig. 5 We write ϕ MSO ϕ if ϕ ϕ is provable in MSO. We also write MSO ϕ for MSO ϕ.
As announced, deduction for MSO is complete w.r.t. the standard model N.
Theorem 2.16 (Siefkes [Sie70] ). For every closed formula ϕ, we have N |= ϕ if and only if MSO ϕ.
Actually obtaining Thm. 2.16 from [Sie70] or [Rib12] requires some easy but tedious work. We only discuss the latter option. The difference between [Rib12] and the present system is that the axiomatization of [Rib12] is expressed in terms of the strict part of≤ (written<, see Notation 2.9) and that comprehension is formulated with the following usual axiom scheme (where X is not free in ϕ):
We state here the properties required to bridge the gap between [Rib12] (2) x< y, y< z x< z The detailed proofs of Lem. 2.17 and Lem. 2.18 are deferred to App. A.
SMSO: A Synchronous Intuitionistic Variant of MSO
We now introduce SMSO, an intuitionistic variant of MSO equipped with an extraction procedure, which is sound and complete w.r.t. Church's synthesis: proofs of existential statements can be translated to finite state synchronous Church-realizers, and such proofs exist for all solvable instances of Church's synthesis (Thm. 3.7, §3.2).
As it is common with intuitionistic versions of classical systems, SMSO has the same language as MSO, and its deduction rules are based on intuitionistic predicate calculus ( Fig. 3 ). As expected, SMSO contains MSO via negative translation. Actually, our limited vocabulary without primitive universal quantifications allows for a Glivenko Theorem, in the sense that SMSO proves ¬¬ϕ iff MSO proves ϕ (Thm. 3.6, §3.1). In order for SMSO to contain a negative translation of MSO while admitting a computational interpretation in the sense of §5, one has to devise appropriate counterparts to the comprehension and induction rules of MSO (2.1):
(where z, y do not occur free in ϕ, ϕ). First, SMSO cannot have the comprehension rule of MSO. The reason is that monadic variables are computational objects in the realizability interpretation of SMSO ( §5), while the comprehension rule of MSO has instances in which the existential monadic quantification cannot be witnessed by computable functions from the parameters of ϕ, ψ and ϕ. The situation is similar to that of higher-type intuitionistic (Heyting) arithmetic, in which predicates, represented as characteristic functions, are computational objects (see e.g. [Koh08] ). 2 The usual solution in that setting is to only admit negative translations of comprehension. We take a similar approach for SMSO. In view of Glivenko's Theorem 3.6, this amounts to equip SMSO with the negative comprehension rule:
Second, for the extraction of finite-state synchronous functions from proofs, the induction scheme of MSO also has to be restricted. Recall the deterministic formulae of Fig. 2 :
Deterministic formulae are to be interpreted by deterministic (not nec. Büchi) automata, and thus have trivial realizers in the sense of §5. As a consequence, we can trivially realize the following deterministic induction rule (where z, y do not occur free in ϕ, δ):
In addition, since deterministic formulae have trivial realizers, we can safely assume in SMSO the elimination of double negation on deterministic formulae:
Note that (3.3) would follow, using the rules of Fig. 3 , by simply assuming elimination of double negation for atomic formulae. Note also that these axioms would follow from induction in a setting like Heyting arithmetic. Furthermore, SMSO is equipped with a positive synchronous restriction of the comprehension rule of MSO, which gives Church-realizers for all solvable instances of Church's synthesis. This synchronous restriction of comprehension asks the comprehension formula to be uniformly bounded in the following sense. (1) Given formulae ϕ and θ and a variable y, the relativization of ϕ to θ[y] (notation ϕ θ[y])
is defined by induction on ϕ as usual:
where, in the clauses for ∃, the variables x and X are assumed not to occur free in θ.
Note that y does not occur free in ϕ θ[y].
. It is uniformly bounded if moreover x is the only free individual variable ofφ.
As we shall see in §4.3, bounded formulae correspond to the formulae of MSO over finite words. We are now ready to define the system SMSO. Similarly as with MSO, we write ϕ SMSO ϕ if ϕ ϕ is provable in SMSO, and we write SMSO ϕ for SMSO ϕ.
Remark 3.3. As usual with natural deduction systems, SMSO satisfies the substitution lemma, which gives the admissibility of the cut rule. We included that rule in SMSO because it corresponds to the composition of realizers in the realizability model, and thus has a natural computational interpretation.
Notation 3.4. In the following, we use a double horizontal line to denote admissible rules. For instance, we freely use the weakening rule ϕ ϕ ϕ, ψ ϕ with the notation ϕ ϕ ϕ, ψ ϕ Remark 3.5. Note that SMSO has a limited set of connectives. In contrast with MSO, which is based on classical logic, the derived connectives of Notation 2.9 do not define the usual corresponding intuitionistic connectives. For example, with ψ → ϕ = ¬(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) as in Not. 2.9, while the usual →-introduction rule is admissible in SMSO:
On the other hand, usual ¬-rules are admissible in SMSO (even without using deterministic double negation elimination):
Indeed, the second rule of the first line follows from the first one, and the third rule is obtained from the first two ones. The rules of the second line all follow from the last two rules of the first line. Finally, the first rule of the first line is obtained as usual: Proof. By induction on MSO-derivations, we show that if ϕ ϕ is derivable in MSO, then ϕ ¬¬ϕ is derivable in SMSO. This amounts to showing that for every MSO-rule of the form (ϕ i ϕ i ) i∈I ψ ψ the following rule is admissible in SMSO:
(ϕ i ¬¬ϕ i ) i∈I ψ ¬¬ψ The logical rules of MSO may be treated exactly as in the usual proof of Glivenko's Theorem. It remains to deal with the non-logical rules of MSO. Comprehension: We have to prove that the following is admissible in SMSO:
ϕ ¬¬ψ[ϕ[y]/X] ϕ ¬¬∃X ψ But this directly follows from the negative comprehension scheme of SMSO together with the last rule of (3.4):
But this follows from deterministic induction together with the last rule of (3.4):
Arithmetic Rules ( Fig. 5 ): All these rules can be treated the same way. We only detail the case of elimination of equality. We have to show that the following rule is admissible in SMSO:
First, note that elimination of equality in SMSO gives
We then obtain the rule (3.5) by successively cutting ¬¬ϕ[x/z] and ¬¬(x . = y) with the corresponding premise of (3.5).
The Main Result.
We are now ready to state the main result of this paper, which says that SMSO is correct and complete (w.r.t. its provable existentials) for Church's synthesis.
The correctness part (1) of Thm. 3.7 is be proved in §5 using a notion of realizability for SMSO based on automata and synchronous finite-state functions. The completeness part (2) is proved in §4.1, relying the completeness of the axiomatization of MSO (Thm. 2.16) together with the correctness of the negative translation ¬¬(−) (Thm. 3.6).
On the Representation of Deterministic Mealy Machines in MSO
This section gathers several (possibly known) results related to the representation of DMMS in MSO. We begin in §4.1 with the completeness part of Thm. 3.7, which follows usual representations of automata in MSO (see e.g. [Tho97, §5.3]). In §4.2, we then recall from [Sie70, Rib12] the Recursion Theorem, which is a convenient tool to reason on runs of deterministic automata in MSO. In §4.3 we state a Lemma for the correctness part of Thm. 3.7, which relies on the usual translation of MSO-formulae over finite words to DFA's (see e.g. [Tho97, §3.1]). Finally, in §4.4 we give a possible strengthening of the synchronous comprehension rule of SMSO, based on Büchi's Theorem 2.10. We work with the following notion of representation. Recall from §2.1 that for k ∈ N, we still write k for the function from N to 2 which takes n to 1 iff n = k. Definition 4.1 (Representation). Let ϕ be a formula with free variables among z, x 1 , . . . , x , X 1 , . . . , X p . We say that ϕ z-represents F : 2 × 2 p −→ M 2 if for all n ∈ N, all B ∈ (2 ω ) p , and all k ∈ N such that k i ≤ n for all i ≤ , we have
For F : 2 × 2 p → M 2 as in Def. 4.1, we write F : 2 p → M 2 (resp. F : 2 → M 2) in case = 0 (resp. p = 0). 
where X = X 1 , . . . , X p codes sequences of inputs, Y codes sequences of outputs, and where Q = Q 1 , . . . , Q q codes runs. 
where O codes the outputs of M while D represents its transition relation on states. 
The completeness of our approach to Church's synthesis is obtained as follows.
Proof of Thm. 3.7.
(2). Assume that ϕ(X; Y ) admits a realizer F : 
(1)), which is itself represented by the deterministic uniformly bounded formula δ 0 [X, x] := (x∈ X). For φ 1 (which asks Y not to have two consecutive occurrences of 0), consider [Rib12] ). The Recursion Theorem makes it possible to define predicates by well-founded induction w.r.t. the relatioṅ < (Notation 2.9). Given formulae ψ = ψ 1 , . . . , ψ q and variables x and X = X 1 , . . . , X q , we say that ψ is x-recursive in X when the following formula Rec x X (ψ) holds:
Theorem 4.6 (Recursion Theorem [Sie70] ). MSO proves the following: (1) W.r.t. the representation used in Prop. 4 
Indeed, assuming I and H are as in Rem. Proof. First, given a formulaφ with free variables among z, x 1 , . . . , x , X 1 , . . . , X p , ifφ is bounded by z thenφ is of the form ψ [−≤ z], where the free variables of ψ are among z,
and where t does not occur free in ψ. We can therefore assume thatφ is of the form ψ [−≤ z] where ψ has free variables among x 1 , . . . , x , X 1 , . . . , X p .
Then, for all n ∈ N, all k ∈ N with k i ≤ n, and all B ∈ (2 ω ) p , we have N |= The proof of Thm. 4.11 relies on the decidability of MSO and on two preliminary lemmas. The first one is the following usual transfer property (see e.g. [Rib12] ). Given a set A ⊆ P(N), write N A for the model defined as the standard model N, but with individuals ranging over A rather than N. Lemma 4.12 (Transfer). Let ϕ be a formula with free variables among x = x 1 , . . . , x and X = X 1 , . . . , X p . Furthermore, let A ∈ 2 ω P(N) be non-empty. Then for all a 1 , . . . , a ∈ A and all B ∈ (2 ω ) p we have
The second result is the following Splitting Lemma, reminiscent of the composition method from a technical point of view. The point of Lem. 4.13 is, given a formula ϕ and a distinguished first-order variable n, to express ϕ using an elementary combination of formulae, each local either to the initial segment [−≤ n] or the final segment [−> n]. Its proof is deferred to App. B. Write FV ι (ϕ) for the set of free individual variables of the formula ϕ.
Lemma 4.13 (Splitting). Consider a formula ψ and some variable z ∈ FV ι (ψ). For every V ⊆ FV ι (ψ) with z ∈ V , one can produce natural number N ψ and two matching sequences of length N ψ of left formulae (L V (ψ) j ) j<N ψ and right formulae (R V (ψ) j ) j<N ψ such that the following holds:
z}, then for all n ∈ N, all a ≤ n and all b > n, we have
We can now prove Thm. 4.11.
Proof of Thm. 4.11. We work in the standard model N of MSO and obtain the result by completeness (Thm. 2.16). Using Lem. 4.13, we know that ψ[X, x] is equivalent to
writing L j (x, X) as a shorthand for L {x} (ψ(x, X)) j and R j (X) for R {x} (X) j . Then, by our assumption that ψ[X, x] (and thus ϕ[X, x]) is semantically bounded, we have
Again using Lem. 4.12, for every j < N ψ and n ∈ N,
Since R j is closed, it follows from the decidability of MSO (Thm. 2.10) that we can decide whether N |= R j or N |= ¬R j . Define accordingly closed formulae R j :
Notice in particular that, contrary to the R j , the R j are invariant under relativization, i.e., the formulae R j and R j [− ≤ x] are syntactically equal. It thus follows that our initial ψ is equivalent to the following formulaφ, which is effectively computable from ψ:
The Realizability Interpretation of SMSO
We now present our realizability model for SMSO, and use it to prove Thm. 3.7.
(1). This realizability interpretation bears some similarities with usual realizability constructions for the Curry-Howard correspondence (see e.g. [SU06, Koh08] ). For instance, as in the usual setting, a realizer of a formula ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 is a pair R 1 , R 2 of a realizer of R 1 of ϕ 1 and a realizer R 2 of ϕ 2 . Similarly, a realizer of ∃X ϕ(X) is a pair B, R of an ω-word B ∈ 2 ω and a realizer R of ϕ(B). However, our construction departs from the standard one on negation (for which we use McNaughton's Theorem 2.12), and for the fact that there is no primitive notion of implication in SMSO. In particular, in contrast with the usual settings, our notion of realizability for sequents of the form ψ ϕ (see Thm. 5.10 and Def. 5.2) is not based on a notion of implication internal to the logic under consideration. Our approach to Church's synthesis via realizability uses automata in two different ways. First, from a proof D in SMSO of an existential formula ∃Y ϕ(X; Y ), one can compute a finite-state synchronous Church-realizer F of ϕ(X; Y ). Second, the adequacy of realizability (and in particular the correctness of F w.r.t. ϕ(X; Y )) is proved using automata for ϕ(X; Y ) obtained by McNaughton's Theorem, but these automata do not have to be built during the extraction procedure. 5.1. Uniform Automata. The adequacy of realizability relies on the notion of uniform automata (adapted from [Rib16] ). In our context, uniform automata are essentially usual non-deterministic automata, but in which non-determinism is expressed via an explicitly given set of moves. This allows for a simple inheritance of the Cartesian structure of synchronous functions (Prop. 2.8), and thus to interpret the strictly positive existentials of SMSO similarly as usual (weak) sums of type theory. In particular, the set of moves M (A) of an automaton A interpreting a formula ϕ exhibits the strictly positive existentials of ϕ as
Definition 5.1 ((Non-Deterministic) Uniform Automata). A (non-deterministic) uniform automaton A over Σ (notation A : Σ) has the form
where Q A is the finite set of states, q ı A ∈ Q A is the initial state, M (A) is the finite non-empty set of moves, the acceptance condition Ω A is an ω-regular subset of Q ω A , and the transition function ∂ A has the form
We say that R is accepting (notation R A(B)) if (q k ) k∈N ∈ Ω A for the sequence of states (q k ) k∈N defined as q 0 := q ı A and q k+1 := ∂ A (q k , B(k), R(k)). We say that A accepts B if there exists an accepting run of A on B, and we let L(A), the language of A, be the set of ω-words accepted by A.
Following the usual terminology, an automaton A as in (5.2) is deterministic if M (A) 1.
Let us now sketch how uniform automata are used in our realizability interpretation of SMSO. First, by adapting to our context usual constructions on automata ( §5.2), to each formula ϕ with free variables among (say) X = X 1 , . . . , X p , we associate a uniform automaton ϕ over 2 p (Fig. 7) . Then, from an SMSO-derivation D of a sequent (say) ϕ ψ, with free variables among X as above, we extract a finite-state synchronous function
In the case of ∃Y φ(X; Y ), the finite-state realizer F D is of the form C, G with C and G finite-state synchronous functions C : 2 p −→ M 2 and G : C(B) ) for all B. This motivates the following notion.
Definition 5.2 (The Category Aut Σ ). For each alphabet Σ, the category Aut Σ has automata A : Σ as objects. Morphisms F from A to B (notation A F : B) are finite-state synchronous
The identity morphism A Id A : A is given by Id A (B, R) := R, and the composition of morphisms A F : B and B G : C is the morphism A G • F : C given by (G • F ) F (B, R) ). It is easy to check the usual identity and composition laws of categories, namely: (2) One could also consider the category AUT Σ defined as Aut Σ , but with maps not required to be finite-state. All statements of §5 hold for AUT Σ , but for Cor. 5.11, which would lead to non necessarily finite-state realizers and would not give Thm. 3.7.(1). (3) Uniform automata are a variation of usual automata on ω-words, which is convenient for our purposes, namely the adequacy of our realizability interpretation. Hence, while it would have been possible to define uniform automata with any of the usual acceptance conditions (see e.g. [Tho97] ), we lose nothing by assuming their acceptance conditions to be given by arbitrary ω-regular sets. (4) Given automata A, B : Σ, checking the existence of a realizer A F : B can be reduced (e.g. using the tools of [PR18, Rib16] ) to checking the existence of a winning strategy for the Proponent (∃loïse) in an ω-regular game on a finite graph, which can in turn be decided by the Büchi-Landweber Theorem [BL69] .
Constructions on Automata.
We gather here constructions on uniform automata that we need to interpret formulae. First, automata are closed under the following operation of finite substitution. Example 5.5. Assume A interprets a formula ϕ with free variables among X, so that B ∈ L(A) iff N |= ϕ[B/X]. Then ϕ is also a formula with free variables among X, Y , and
The Cartesian structure of M lifts to Aut Σ . This gives the interpretation of conjunctions.
Proposition 5.6. For each Σ, the category Aut Σ has finite products. Its terminal object is the automaton I = (1, •, 1, ∂ I , 1 ω ), where ∂ I (−, −, −) = •. Binary products are given by
and where (q n , q n ) n ∈ Ω iff ((q n ) n ∈ Ω A and (q n ) n ∈ Ω B ). Note that Ω is ω-regular since Ω A and Ω B are ω-regular (see e.g. Proof. The Cartesian structure is directly inherited from M and is omitted. Moreover, we obviously have L(I) = Σ ω . Let us show that L(A 1 × A 2 ) = L(A 1 ) ∩ L(A 2 ). The inclusion (⊆) follows from Rem. 5.3.
(1) applied to the projection maps A 1 × A 2 i : A i induced by the Cartesian structure. For the converse inclusion (⊇), note that if
Uniform automata are equipped with the obvious adaptation of the usual projection on non-deterministic automata, which interprets existentials. Given a uniform automaton A : Σ × Γ, its projection on Σ is the automaton ¬ψ x,X := ∼ ψ x,X ∃X ψ x,X := ∃ 2 ( ψ x,X,X ) 
The Realizability Interpretation.
We are now going to define our realizability interpretation. This goes in two steps:
(1) To each formula ϕ we associate a uniform automaton ϕ .
(2) To each derivation D of a (closed) sequent ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ϕ in SMSO, we associate a finite state synchronous F D such that ϕ 1 × · · · × ϕ n F D : ϕ . Then Theorem 3.7.
(1) (stated as Corollary 5.11 below) follows directly from the definition of ∃X ϕ . We first discuss step (1). Consider a formula ϕ with free variables among x = x 1 , . . . , x and X = X 1 , . . . , X p . Its interpretation is a uniform automaton ϕ x,X over 2 × 2 p , defined by induction on ϕ, and such that δ x,X is deterministic for a deterministic δ. We thus have to devise a deterministic uniform automaton A(α) for each atomic formula α of SMSO. The definitions of the A(α)'s are easy and follow usual constructions (see e.g. [Tho97] ). They are deferred to App. C. Moreover, in order to handle individual variables, the interpretation also uses a deterministic uniform automaton Sing : 2 accepting the language of ω-words B ∈ 2 ω P(N) such that B is a singleton. App. C also presents a possible definition for Sing. The interpretation ϕ x,X is defined in Fig. 7 , where π, π are suitable projections. We write ϕ when x, X are irrelevant or understood from the context. Note that the set of moves M (ϕ) of ϕ indeed satisfies (5.1), so in particular δ is indeed deterministic for a deterministic δ.
As expected, the interpretation − is correct in the following sense. For k ∈ N, we keep on writing k for the function from N to 2 which takes n to 1 iff n = k.
Proposition 5.9. Given a formula ϕ with free variables among x = x 1 , . . . , x and X = X 1 , . . . , X p , for all k ∈ N and all
We now turn to step (2). Let ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , ϕ be formulae and consider variables x = x 1 , . . . , x and X = X 1 , . . . , X p containing all the free variables of ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , ϕ. Then we say that a synchronous function
x, X-realizes the sequent ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ϕ (notation ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n x,X F : ϕ or ϕ x,X F : ϕ) if
Sing × ϕ 1 x,X × · · · × ϕ n x,X F : ϕ x,X Theorem 5.10 (Adequacy). Let ϕ, ϕ be formulae with variables among x, X. From an SMSO-derivation D of ϕ ϕ, one can compute an M-morphism F D s.t. ϕ x,X F D : ϕ.
Adequacy of realizability, together with Prop. 5.7, directly gives Theorem 3.7.(1).
Corollary 5.11 (Thm. 3.7.(1) ). Consider a formula ϕ(X; Y ) with only X, Y free, where
The proof of Thm. 5.10 goes by induction on derivations. Most of the rules of SMSO are straightforward, except the synchronous comprehension rule, that we discuss first. Adequacy for synchronous comprehension follows from the existence of finite-state characteristic functions for bounded formulae (Lem. 4.8) and from the following lemmas, which allow us, given a synchronous function C y-represented byφ, to lift a realizer of ψ[φ[y]/Y ] to a realizer of ∃Y ψ.
Lemma 5.12 (Substitution Lemma for Synchronous Comprehension). Let x = x 1 , . . . , x and X = X 1 , . . . , X p . Letφ be a formula with free variables among y, X, and which yrepresents C : 2 p −→ M 2. Then for every formula ψ with free variables among x, X, Y , for all k ∈ N and all B ∈ (2 ω ) p (2 p ) ω we have
Proof. By induction on ψ. 
/X] Then we are done since it follows from Prop. 5.9 that
• If ψ = ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 , then by Prop. 5.6 we have
and we conclude by induction hypothesis. Lemma 5.13 (Lifting Lemma for Synchronous Comprehension). Let x = x 1 , . . . , x and X = X 1 , . . . , X p . Letφ be a formula with free variables among y, X, and which y-represents C : 2 p −→ M 2. Then for every formula ψ with free variables among x, X, Y , there is a finite-state synchronous function
Proof. By induction on ψ. We can finally prove of Thm. 5.10.
Proof of Thm. 5.10. The proof is by induction on derivations. Note that if ϕ SMSO ϕ, then the universal closure of the implication ∧ϕ → ϕ holds in the standard model N. In particular, for all rules whose conclusion is of the form ϕ δ with δ deterministic, it follows from Prop. 5.9 and (5.1) that the unique M-map with codomain M (δ) 1 (and with appropriate domain) is a realizer. This handles the rules of negative comprehension (3.1), deterministic induction as well as the rules ϕ ∃y Z(y) and ϕ ∃y S(x, y). For the latter, we use the DMM depicted in Fig. 1 (left) (Ex. 2.4.(2) ) together with the fact that S(−, −) is deterministic. The case of the former is similar and simpler. As for elimination of equality, we take as realizer of the conclusion the realizer of the left premise. This realizer is trivially correct if there is no realizer of the assumptions ϕ. Otherwise the result follows from Prop. 5.9 since the right premise ensures that the individual variables y and z are interpreted by the same natural number. Adequacy for synchronous comprehension is given by Lem. 5.14. It remains to deal with the rules of Fig. 3 . The first two rules follow from the fact that each Aut Σ is a category with finite products (Prop. 5.6). The rules for ¬/⊥ are trivial since their conclusions are of the form ϕ δ. The rules for conjunction follow from Prop. 5.6 and those for existential quantifications follow from Prop. 5.7.
Indexed Structure on Automata
In §5 we have defined one category Aut Σ for each alphabet Σ. These categories are actually related by substitution functors arising from M-morphisms, inducing an indexed (or fibred ) structure. Substitution functors are a basic notion of categorical logic, which allows for categorical axiomatizations of quantifications. We refer to e.g. [Jac01, Chap. 1] for background.
We present here the fibred structure of the categories Aut (−) and show that the existential quantifiers ∃ (−) and Cartesian product (−) × (−) of §5.2 satisfy the expected properties of existential quantifiers and conjunction in categorical logic. These properties essentially correspond to the adequacy of the logical rules of Fig. 3 that do not mention negation (¬) nor falsity (⊥). Although the fibred structure is not technically necessary to prove the adequacy of our realizability model, following such categorical axiomatization was a guideline in its design. Besides, categorical logic turns out to be an essential tool when dealing with generalizations to (say) alternating automata.
6.1. The Basic Idea. Before entering the details, let us try to explain the main ideas in the usual setting of first-order logic over a manysorted individual language. The categorical semantics of existential quantifications is given by an adjunction ∃x ϕ(x) ψ (x not free in ψ) ϕ(x) ψ (6.1) This adjunction induces a bijection between (the interpretations of) proofs of the sequents ϕ(x) ψ and ∃x ϕ(x) ψ, that we informally denote
Now, in general the variable x occurs free in ϕ. As a consequence, in order to properly formulate (6.1) one should be able to interpret sequents of the form ϕ(x) ψ with free variables. More generally, the formulae ϕ and ψ should be allowed to contain free variables distinct from x. The idea underlying the general method (see e.g. [Jac01] for details), is to first devise a base category B of individuals, whose objects interpret products of sorts of the individual language, and whose maps from say ι 1 ×· · ·×ι m to o 1 ×· · ·×o n represent n-tuples (t 1 , . . . , t n ) of terms t i of sort o i whose free variables are among x ι 1 , . . . , x ιm , with x ι j of sort ι j . Then, for each object ι = ι 1 × · · · × ι m of B, one devises a category E ι whose objects represent formulae with free variables among x ι 1 , . . . , x ιm , and whose morphisms interpret proofs. Furthermore, B-morphisms t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) : ι 1 × · · · × ι m −→ o 1 × · · · × o n induce substitution functors
The functor t takes (the interpretation of) a formula ϕ whose free variables are among y o 1 , . . . , y on to (the interpretation of) the formula ϕ[t 1 /y o 1 , . . . , t n /y on ] with free variables among x ι 1 , . . . , x ιm . Its action on the morphisms of E o 1 ×···×on allows us to interpret the substitution rule ϕ ψ ϕ[t 1 /y o 1 , . . . , t n /y on ] ψ[t 1 /y o 1 , . . . , t n /y on ] In very good situations, the operation (−) is itself functorial. Among the morphisms of B, one usually requires the existence of projections, say with free variables among y o , x ι (but with no actual occurrence of x ι ). Then the proper formulation of (6.1) is that existential quantification over x ι is a functor
does not occur free in ψ since ψ is assumed to be (interpreted as) an object of E o , thus replacing the usual side condition). Universal quantifications are dually axiomatized as right adjoints to weakening functors. In both cases, the adjunctions are subject to additional conditions (called the Beck-Chevalley conditions) which ensure that they are preserved by substitution.
6.2. Substitution. So far, for each alphabet Σ we have defined a category Aut Σ of uniform automata over Σ. Following §6.1, different categories Aut Σ , Aut Γ can be related by means of M-morphisms F : Σ → Γ. This relies on a very simple substitution operation on automata, generalizing the substitution operation presented in Prop. 5.4. Definition 6.1 (Substitution). Given a DMM M : Σ → Γ as in Def. 2.2 and an automaton A : Γ as in Def. 5.1, the automaton A[M] : Σ is defined as follows: We now characterize the language of A[M]. To this end, it is useful to note that Σ ω is in bijection with the set of synchronous functions 1 ω → Σ ω . Proposition 6.2. Given a DMM M : Σ → Γ and an automaton A : Γ, for B ∈ Σ ω we have: 6.3. Categorical Existential Quantifications. Recall from §5.2 that uniform automata are equipped with existential quantifications, given by an adaption of the usual projection operation on non-deterministic automata. Given A : Σ × Γ, we defined ∃ Γ A : Σ as
We are now going to see that ∃ (−) is an existential quantification in the usual categorical sense of simple coproducts (see e.g. [Jac01, Def. 1.9.1]). First, the weakening functors Proof. Fix alphabets Σ and Γ. According to [ML98, Thm. IV.1.2.(ii)], we have to show that for each automaton A : Σ × Γ, there is an Aut Σ×Γ -morphism
satisfying the following universal property: for each automaton B : Σ and each Aut Σ×Γmorphism F : A −→ B[π] there is a unique Aut Σ -morphism
Note that η A must be an M-morphism
We let η A be the M-morphism induced by the usual projection
, we are left with the following trivial fact: there is a unique
The Beck-Chevalley condition of [Jac01, Def. 1.9.1] asks for the following isomorphism in Aut ∆ , where A : Σ × Γ and F : ∆ → M Σ:
This isomorphism follows from the fact that the two above automata have the same set of moves (namely Γ × M (A)).
6.4. Categorical Conjunction. Recall from §5.2 that each category Aut Σ has Cartesian products, which interpret conjunction, a necessary feature to interpret a sequent as a morphism from the conjunct of its premises to its conclusion. In the setting of categorical logic, it remains to be shown that these products are fibred in the sense of [Jac01, Def. 1.8.1], i.e. that they are preserved by substitution. But we see no reason for this to be possible. In particular there is no reason for the DMM M F •G chosen to induce F • G to be a product of M F and M G . However, since A[M] always has the same moves as A, we actually get (6.2) modulo isomorphisms. This is a usual situation in categorical logic. It is indeed customary to relax the requirement of (−) to be a functor, and only ask it to be a pseudo functor, i.e. a functor for which identities and composition are only preserved up to natural isomorphisms, subject to some specific coherence conditions (see e.g. [Jac01, Def. 1.4.4]). The required natural isomorphisms have the form
Since A and A[M] have the same moves, we can take for each components of η Σ and µ F,G synchronous functions acting as identities on runs. It then follows that all the required diagrams commute. We now proceed to the formal construction. Fix for each M-morphism F : Σ → M Γ a chosen DMM M F inducing F . For each A : Σ, and each M-morphisms G : ∆ → M Γ and F : Γ → M Σ, we let
be given by
The following says that the coherence conditions required for structure maps of pseudofunctors (see e.g. [Jac01, Def. 1.4.4]) are met by η Σ,A and µ F,G,A . The proof is trivial.
Proposition 6.5. The morphisms η Σ and µ F,G defined above are natural isomorphisms as in (6.3). Moreover, for each automaton A : Σ and each M-maps F, G, H of appropriate domains and codomains, the two diagrams of Fig. 8 commute.
The assignment (−) : M op → Cat taking the alphabet Σ to the category Aut Σ and the morphism F : Γ → M Σ to the functor (−)[M F ] : Aut Σ → Aut Γ is thus a pseudo-functor.
Conclusion
In this paper, we revisited Church's synthesis via an automata-based realizability interpretation of an intuitionistic proof system SMSO for MSO on ω-words, and we demonstrated that our approach is sound and complete, in the sense of Thm. 3.7. As it stands, this approach must still pay the price of the non-elementary lower-bound for the translation of MSO formulae over finite words to DFA's (see Rem. 4.9) and the system SMSO is limited by its set of connectives and its restricted induction scheme.
Further Works. First, the indexed structure ( §6.5) induced by the substitution operation of §6.2 suggests that in our context, it may be profitable to work in a conservative extension of (S)MSO, with one function symbol for each Mealy machine together with defining axioms of the form (4.2). In particular, this could help mitigate Rem. 4.9 by giving the possibility, in the synchronous comprehension scheme of SMSO, to give a term for a Mealy machine rather than the MSO-formula representing it. We expect this to give better lower bounds w.r.t. completeness (for each solvable instance of Church's synthesis, to provide proofs with realizers of a reasonable complexity).
Second, following the approach of [Rib16] , SMSO could be extended with primitive universal quantifications and implications as soon as one goes to a linear deduction system. Among outcomes of going to a linear deduction system, following [Rib16] we expect similar proof-theoretical properties as with the usual Dialectica interpretation (see e.g. [Koh08] ), such as realizers of linear Markov rules and choices schemes. Also, having primitive universal quantifications may allow us to take benefit of the reductions of MSO to its negative fragment, as provided by the Safraless approaches to synthesis [KV05, KPV06, FJR11] .
Obtaining a good handle of induction in SMSO is more complex. One possibility to have finite-state realizers for a more general induction rule would be to rely on saturation techniques for regular languages. Another possibility, which may be of practical interest, is to follow the usual Curry-Howard approach and allow for possibly infinite-state realizers.
Another direction of future work is to incorporate specific reasoning principles on Mealy machines. For instance, a possibility could be to base our deduction system on a complete equational theory for Mealy machines.
S is the Successor for<: ∀x, y S(x, y) ←→ x< y ∧ ¬∃z(x< z< y)
Strict Linear Order Axioms:
Predecessor and Unboundedness Axioms: Proof. From reflexivity of equality.
(2) x< y, y< z x< z Proof. We have x< y, y< z x≤ z and x< y, y< z, x . = z ⊥ by the partial order rules for≤. Proof. The basic and arithmetic rules above ensure that every x has a successor y, and that the successor satisfies x≤ y. Thus, in combination with (3), we get that x< y. (6) Z(x) x≤ y Proof. By induction on y.
(7) x≤ y, Z(y) Z(x) Proof. By (6), we have Z(y) y≤ x and we conclude by the partial order rule for≤.
(8) ∀y(x≤ y) Z(x) Proof. We have ∀y(x≤ y), Z(z) x≤ z Hence by (7) we get ∀y(x≤ y), Z(z) Z(x) and we conclude by the basic rules for Z. This concludes the proof of Lem. 2.17.
The linear order axioms ((1), (2), (12)), the successor axiom (13), the unboundedness (4) and predecessor (11) axioms are thus proved in our axiomatic. Finally, we have to prove Lem. 2.18, namely that strong induction is derivable in MSO. The proof holds no surprise. Notice that φ(x) is equivalent to φ (x ) := ∀y(y< x → Xy) thanks to (11). By (12), we have three subcase according to:
Proof of
The first case enables us to use φ (x ) directly, and the second one follows from the assumption ∀x(∀y(y< x → Xy) → Xx together with φ (x ). The last one leads to a contradiction using the antisymmetry of≤.
Appendix B. Internally Bounded Formulae ( §4.4)
We prove here the Splitting Lemma 4.13, used in the proof of Thm. 4.11. We consider formulae over the vocabulary of [Rib12] , that is formulae given by the grammar ϕ, ψ ∈ Λ ::= x∈ X | x< y | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ∃X ϕ | ∃x ϕ to whether x ∈ V or not. • If ψ = ϕ ∨ φ, then it is clear that taking the concatenation of the sequences of formulae given by the induction hypothesis is enough
• If ψ = ∃x φ, using our induction hypothesis, we have N φ ∈ N and sequences of formulae (L V (φ) j , R V (φ) j , L V ∪{x} (φ) j , R V ∪{x} (φ) j ) j<N φ satisfying the conclusion of Lem. B.1. For j < N φ , define
The disjunction is seen to be equivalent to ∃x φ by making a case analysis over whether x≤ n holds.
• If ψ = ∃X ϕ, then it directly follows from (B.1) that we can take L V (ψ) j := ∃X L V (ϕ) j and R V (ψ) j := ∃X R V (ϕ) j for j < N ϕ . • If ψ = ¬φ, using our induction hypothesis, we have a natural number N φ and two sequences of formulae (
Hence all we need to do is to add the negation, push it through the disjunction and conjunctions using De Morgan laws and make the disjuncts commute over the conjunction in the obtained formula. More explicitly (leaving the parameters implicit), we have:
Remark B.2. Note that there is a combinatorial explosion in the case of ψ = ¬φ in Lem. B.1 since N ¬φ = 2 N φ . It follows that the sizes of the formulae computed in Lem. B.1 and the subsequent Thm. 4.11 are non-elementary in the size of ψ.
Appendix C. Automata for Atomic Formulae ( §5.3)
We give below the automaton Sing (of §5.3) and automata for the atomic formulae of Fig. 2 . These automata are presented as deterministic Büchi automata (with accepting states circled). As uniform automata, each of them has set of moves 1. Note that automata for atomic formulae involving individual variables do not detect if the corresponding inputs actually represent natural numbers. This is harmless, since all statements of §5 actually assume streams representing natural numbers to be singletons, and since in Fig. 7 , quantifications over individuals are relativized to Sing.
• Sing : • (x 1∈ X 1 ) :
0 1 (0, * )(1, 0)
(1, 1) ( * , * )
Proof. Consider ψ = ψ 1 , . . . , ψ q and variables x and X = X 1 , . . . , X q , and assume Rec x X (ψ). We begin with the second part of the statement, namely the uniqueness part. Fix Y , Z. By strong induction on z (Lem. 2.18), we show that MSO proves each of the following formulae
Let z and assume the premise of ϕ i (z), as well as ϕ i (y) for all y< z. The premise of ϕ i (z) implies that of ϕ i (y) for y< z, so that we have (Z i y ↔ Y i y) for all y< z. Hence, given x≤ z, if x< z then we are done. It thus remains to show (Z i z ↔ Y i z). Thanks to the premise of ϕ i (z), this amounts to showing ψ i (Z, z) ↔ ψ i (Y , z), which itself follows from Rec x X (ψ), since (Z j y ↔ Y j y) for all y< z and all j = 1, . . . , q.
We now turn to the first part of the statement. For each i = 1, . . . , q let Z i such that Given X such that X j x ↔ ψ j (X, x) for all x≤ z and all j = 1, . . . , q, we obtain X i z from ψ i (X, z), which itself follows from ψ i (Z, z) and Rec(ψ). The premise of Rec(ψ) follows from the conjunction of the (∀x< z)ϕ j (Z, X, x), whose premises are in turn given resp. by the conjunction of the (∀y< z)ϑ j (x) and by the assumption on X. Case of Z i z −→ ψ i (Z, z): Assume Z i z. By comprehension let X such that
We obtain ψ i (Z, z) from X i z, which in turn by def. of Z i follows from the conjunction of the (∀x≤ z) X j x ↔ ψ j (X, x) . In order to show the latter, note that by definition of X we have (X k x ↔ Z k x) for all x< z and all k = 1, . . . , q. Hence Rec(ψ) gives ψ j (X, z) ↔ ψ j (Z, z) and we get (X j z ↔ ψ j (X, z)) from the definition of X. In the case of x< z, namely (X j x ↔ ψ j (X, x)), we have (∀y≤ x)(X j y ↔ Z j y) so that Rec(ψ) implies ψ j (X, x) ↔ ψ j (Z, x) and the result follows from ϑ j (x).
